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Abstract
The ability to preserve user privacy and anonymity is im-
portant. One of the safest ways to maintain privacy is
to avoid storing personally identifiable information (PII),
which poses a challenge for maintaining useful user statis-
tics. Probabilistic counting has been used to find the car-
dinality of a multiset when precise counting is too re-
source intensive. In this paper, probabilistic counting is
used as an anonymization technique that provides a re-
liable estimate of the number of unique users. We ex-
tend previous work in probabilistic counting by consider-
ing its use for preserving user anonymity, developing ap-
plication guidelines and including hash collisions in the
estimate. Our work complements previous method by
attempting to explore the causes of the deviation of un-
corrected estimate from the real value. The experimental
results show that if the proper register size is used, col-
lision compensation provides estimates are as good as, if
not better than, the original probabilistic counting. We
develop a new anonymity metric to precisely quantify the
degree of anonymity the algorithm provides.
1 Introduction
Privacy preserving data mining, also known as statistical
disclosure control, inference control or private data anal-
ysis [3, 1] seeks to protect statistical data so they can be
publicly released and mined while preserving privacy [2].
Related techniques are widely used in domains like med-
ical informatics or opinion polling, where patients feel
uncomfortable about divulging information on issues like
their frequency of drug use, or HIV status [4].
Storage of personally identifiable information (PII) like
name, social security number (SSN), IP or MAC ad-
dresses can be easily used to compromise users’ privacy.
Consider the recent Ashley Madison data disclosure [8].
So the best way to preserve user privacy is to not keep
any PII. Methods like this are effective in foiling attack-
ers, but make the task of maintaining user statistics very
challenging. This paper shows how to maintain an accu-
rate estimate of the number of unique users while protect-
ing the privacy of each individual user by using statistical
counting.
The work presented here builds on probabilistic count-
ing introduced by Flajolet and Martin [6], which estimates
the number of distinct records/users (cardinality) without
keeping the records. It is based on statistical analysis of
the bit positions of hashed records. The position of the
least significant bit set in each hashed record is stored in
a register called a BITMAP. From the bit position of the
lowest bit that is not set on the BITMAP, we get an unbi-
ased estimate of the cardinality of the user set. For exam-
ple, the input records could be the users’ SSL certificates.
This paper makes three main contributions.
• Probabilistic counting has been used for estimating
the cardinality of a multiset when it is unrealistic (too
resource-intensive to store or count the elements) to
solve precisely [11]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time the algorithm is used to preserve
privacy and anonymity.
• We propose collision-included probabilistic count-
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ing (CIPC), which includes the hash collisions in the
estimate. The Birthday paradox [13] is used to de-
termine the number of collisions. The results of our
experiments show that adding collisions to the un-
corrected estimate of the number of users, gives a
more accurate count than using a constant correction
factor [6]. This also verifies that hash collision is a
major cause of bias for probabilistic counting.
• We also provide an anonymity metric to measure the
anonymity the proposed algorithm provides.
This paper was inspired by problems we faced when
maintaining user privacy while collecting usage statistics
for a censorship circumvention tool [9]. The tool devel-
oped is used by dissidents and journalists, working in po-
litically challenging regions in West Africa, to circumvent
DNS and IP address blocking by leveraging technologies
developed for use by criminal botnet enterprises [12]. To
quantify the number of unique users of the system, a se-
cure method was needed to keep track of the statistics. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first time probabilis-
tic counting is applied to safeguarding user privacy .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2 we present background on probabilistic counting
and the hash function used in the proposed algorithm.
We present the collision-included probabilistic counting
(CIPC) algorithm in section 3. Experimental results are
given along with the recommendation for selecting the
proper register/BITMAP size. We conclude the paper and
point out future work for this research in section 4.
2 Background
This section covers previous probabilistic counting work.
Probabilistic counting [6] estimates the number of dis-
tinct elements (cardinality) in a large collection of data
that contain duplicates. It requires only a small amount
of storage and few operations per element. The algorithm
works as follows:
Inputs: A multiset of records χ ′; a register/BITMAP b
of length L initialized to zero (see Figure 1).
Output: The estimate of the number of distinct records,
denoted by M.
Figure 1: Bitmap b initialized to zero.
Step 1 A hash function h(x) that maps each element of
χ ′ to an integer. This set of integers is uniformly
distributed over the range [0,1, · · · ,2L−1].
Step 2 For each record x ∈ χ ′, let LSSB(h(x)) be the po-
sition of the least significant bit that is set in the bi-
nary representation of h(x), 0≤LSSB(h(x))≤ L−1.
Set the corresponding BITMAP position to 1. That is,
if LSSB(h(x)) = i, then b[i] = 1. For example, b[4]
will be set to 1 if h(x) = · · ·011010000.
Step 3 Let k be the position of the rightmost zero in
BITMAP b. The estimated value of the number of
unique records in χ ′ is given by
M˜PC =
1
ϕ
·2k (1)
where ϕ = 0.77351 · · · is the correction factor.
The algorithm is based on statistical observations con-
cerning the bits of hashed values. Let χ denote the set
of distinct records in χ ′. Since h(x) is uniformly dis-
tributed over [0,1, · · · ,2L−1], for eachx ∈ χ , h(x) = · · ·1
with probability 1/2, h(x) = · · ·10 with probability 1/4,
h(x) = · · ·100 with probability 1/8 and so on. This can
be generalized as the sequence · · ·10 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
occurring with
probability of 1/2k [6]. So if we randomly select x ∈ χ ,
the probability of LSSB(x) = k being set to 1 is 1/2k.
The BITMAP only depends on the least significant set
bits (LSSBs) of distinct hashed values and not on the fre-
quency of the values. If a record occurs more than once
in multiset χ ′, it will be counted only once.
Let M be the number of distinct records in χ ′, i.e.,
M = |χ|, it is expected that b[0] will be set about M/2
times, b[1] will be set approximately M/4 times and so
on. At the end of the execution, it is very likely that
b[i] = 0 for i log2M and b[i] = 1 for i log2M [6].
Figure 2: The mapping of 20000 distinct records to their
bit position in the BITMAP
An example is illustrated in Figure 2. Assuming there
are M = 20000 distinct records, about 10000 records will
have their LSSB be bit 0, that is, about M/2 of the hash
values are mapped to b[0]; about 5000 records are mapped
to bit position 1, i.e., approximately M/4 records are
mapped to b[1], and so on [7].
It was proposed in [6] to use the position of the right-
most zero in BITMAP as an indicator of log2M, based
on the assumption that hash values will be uniformly
distributed over
[
0,1, · · · ,2L−1]. For example, if the
BITMAP is [· · ·1010111111︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1 = 6
], the cardinality M, is esti-
mated by
M ≈ 2k = 26
It is shown in [6, 5], 2k is a biased estimate of M and
a correction factor ϕ ≈ 0.77351 can be used as a sim-
ple correction. The unbiased estimate of cardinality M is
given by
M˜PC =
1
ϕ
·2k
3 Collision-Included Probabilistic
Counting (CIPC)
The plot of M˜ = 2k is in Figure 3, where k is the posi-
tion of the rightmost zero in the BITMAP. It is not hard to
see that 2k gives an underestimate of M for the most part.
And the gap between 2k and M gets larger as M increases.
According to (1), probabilistic counting uses a correction
factor ϕ = 0.77351 · · · to compensate for the deviation of
using 2k as an indicator of M. Although rigorous calcu-
lation of ϕ is provided in [6], the cause of the deviation
is not discussed. In this section, we consider the effects
of collisions in hashing and how including the collisions
in hashing will improve the estimate. The experimenta-
tion results show that our approach produces an estimate
at least as good as using ϕ , or even better under certain
circumstances. Moreover, our approach provides some
insight into the possible cause of the estimation bias.
3.1 Collision Estimate using Birthday Para-
dox
Even with uniform hash functions, it is inevitable that
more than one record will be mapped to the same hash
value, which is known as a collision. Although the
BITMAP is set to be big enough to hold all the records
(i.e., 2L > |χ|), the probability of collisions increases
with increasing number of records, especially when L is
fixed. Therefore, we propose collision-included proba-
bilistic counting (CIPC). We calculate the expected num-
ber of collisions and add it to 2k to improve the results.
Birthday paradox [14] is adopted to estimate the expected
number of collisions of multiplication hashing.
Theorem 1. If the position of the rightmost zero in
BITMAP (ranks start at 0) is used as an indicator of
log2M, under the assumption that the hash values are uni-
formly distributed, the expected value of M including col-
lisions is:
M˜CIPC =
⌊
log1− 1
2L
(
1−2k−L
)⌋
(2)
where M˜CIPC is the estimate of M obtained using
collision-included probabilistic counting (CIPC).
Proof.
Since the M hash values are uniformly distributed over
Figure 3: Probabilistic Counting Estimate Deviation.
[0,1, · · · ,2L− 1], according to birthday paradox [10], the
expected number of collisions is
C =M−2L+2L
(2L−1
2L
)M
(3)
where C is the number of collisions. Since 2k is the esti-
mate of M without including the number of collisions, we
have
M˜CIPC ≈ 2k+C (4)
Substituting (3) into (4) yields
M˜CIPC ≈ 2k+M−2L+2L
(2L−1
2L
)M
(5)
Given that M˜CIPC =M, solving (5) for M˜CIPC gives us
M˜CIPC =
⌊
log1− 1
2L
(
1−2k−L
)⌋
(6)
Figure 4 shows a flowchart of CIPC used to estimate
the number of distinct system users.
3.2 Experiment Results
To evaluate the proposed algorithm, a set of experiments
are performed for different values of M with different reg-
ister sizes ,L, using both probabilistic counting and CIPC.
Figure 4: Flow chart of the system.
The same multiplication hash function was used in both
algorithms.
In each experiment, we randomly picked M distinct in-
tegers that range between 1 and 2× 105 and used them
as the records. For each value of M, the experiment was
repeated for 50 times using each algorithm. We then took
the average as the final estimate of M.
The results of the experiment are given in Table 1 and
Table 2. Each table corresponds to a different register size
(L). Columns named “CI∗” contain 95% confidence inter-
val (CI) of the corresponding estimate. For easy and direct
comparison of the results, we also calculated the Percent
Error (PE) of each estimate using formula
Percent Error=
∣∣∣∣∣Estimate−True valueTrue value
∣∣∣∣∣×100% (7)
The lower the percent error (PE) is, the closer the estimate
is to the true value. Based on this rule, we compare the
performance of CIPC with probabilistic counting in terms
of estimation accuracy.
• L = blog2Mc: As shown in Table 1, PECIPC is smaller
than PEPC for all tested M. This means CIPC always
produces a more accurate estimate than probabilistic
counting in our experiments. But the advantage is not
significant (mostly 1-3% lower in PE rate).
M M˜PC CIPC
Percent Error
(PEPC)
M˜CIPC CICIPC
Percent Error
(PECIPC)
1×103 558 (502, 614) 44.1506%(min) 579 (508, 649)
42.0687%
(min)
5×103 2158 (1856, 2460) 56.8314% 2233 (1862, 2603) 55.3373%
1×104 4236 (3613, 4859) 57.6372% 4348 (3567, 5129) 56.514%
2×104 8869 (7580, 10158) 55.6515% 9236 (7662, 10810) 53.816%
3×104 10590 (10590, 10590) 64.6977% 11356 (11356, 11356) 62.1466%
4×104 18673 (16211, 21134) 53.3173% 19649 (16670, 22627) 50.8772%
5×104 19769 (17705, 21832) 60.4614% 20940 (18351, 23529) 58.1189%
6×104 17651 (11911, 23390) 70.5814%(max) 18283 (11083, 25483)
69.5277%
(max)
7×104 32556 (27636, 37476) 53.4906% 33476 (27553, 39400) 52.1758%
8×104 35673 (30798, 40549) 55.4076% 37033 (30917, 43150) 53.7076%
9×104 34216 (27734, 40697) 61.98215% 35205 (27074, 43335) 60.8833%
1×105 34125 (28841, 39409) 65.8744% 35091 (28462, 41719) 64.9085%
Table 1: Experimental result with L= blog2Mc
M M˜PC CIPC
Percent Error
(PEPC)
M˜CIPC CICIPC
Percent Error
(PECIPC)
1×103 884 (769, 1000) 11.5191% 886 (749, 1024) 11.3326%
5×103 3530 (3097, 3962) 29.3954% 3498 (2971,4024) 30.033%
1×104 6586 (5573, 7598) 34.1391% 6504 (5306,7702) 34.954%
2×104 14872 (13048, 16695) 25.6398% 15000 (12802, 17197) 24.9991%
3×104 16878 (14796,18961) 43.73699% 17414 (14873,19954) 41.9531%
4×104 28536 (24627,32444) 28.6599% 28344 (23577, 33111) 29.1381%
5×104 31772 (27465, 36078) 36.4558% 32248 (26922, 37574) 35.5024%
6×104 31772 (26664, 36879) 47.0465%(max) 32404 (26193, 38615)
45.9927%
(max)
7×104 89838 (74745,104931) 28.3403% 88414
(71114,
105714) 26.3064%
8×104 94758 (80114,109403) 18.4484% 93213
(76323,
110103) 16.5168%
9×104 100233 (85382,115083)
11.3702%
(min) 99416
(82157,
116675)
10.4628%
(min)
1×105 68839 (61495, 76183) 31.1605% 71098 (62014, 80182) 28.9014%
Table 2: Experimental result with L= blog2Mc+1
M M˜PC CIPC
Percent Error
(PEPC)
M˜CIPC CICIPC
Percent Error
(PECIPC)
1×103 1109 (919, 1299) 10.9853% 1034 (822, 1245) 3.4%
5×103 5395 (4446, 6344) 7.905% 5248 (4168, 6329) 4.9732%
1×104 10590 (8972, 12208) 5.9068% 10082 (8227, 11936) 0.8203%
2×104 22140 (18757, 25522) 10.7% 21374 (17511, 25238) 6.8742%
3×104 28241 (25109, 31374) 14.2658% 24377 (21443, 27312) 15.7221%(max)
4×104 44833 (37089, 52578) 12.0847% 38585 (31495, 45676) 3.53508%
5×104 54718 (46912, 62524) 9.437% 47616 (40421, 54812) 4.7661%
6×104 56898 (49628, 64169) 5.1683% (min) 57107 (48475, 65739) 4.8209%
7×104 77665 (64776, 90553) 10.95% 65704 (53884, 77524) 6.1366%
8×104 92844 (78001,107688)
16.0562%
(max) 79811 (66157, 93464) 0.2361% (min)
9×104 101317 (86236,116398) 12.575% 87580
(73666,
101495) 2.68812%
1×105 110613 (95856,125371) 10.6138% 111035
(93671,
128399) 11.0354%
Table 3: Experimental result with L= blog2Mc+2
• L = blog2Mc+ 1: As shown in Table 2, CIPC gives
about the same results as probabilistic counting. No
significant difference is observed among the estimates
generated using the two algorithms. But it is worth
mentioning that both maximum PECIPC and minimum
PECIPC are smaller than the corresponding parameters
of probabilistic counting.
• L= blog2Mc+2: As shown in Table 3, CIPC provides
significantly superior estimate accuracy to probabilistic
counting except for M = 3× 104 and 1× 105. Half of
the PEPC are several times bigger than the correspond-
ing PECIPC.
Based on the results of our experiments, it is safe to say
that CIPC outperforms probabilistic counting in general.
4 Conclusion
To accurately estimate the number users of an anonymous
system, we adopted probabilistic counting algorithm to
develop collision included probabilistic counting (CIPC),
which does not store identifiable information of system
users. CIPC includes the hash collisions to the estimate
which gives a more accurate estimate than the original
probabilistic counting. Based on simulation results, we
recommend using L≈ blog2M˜c+2 as the register size to
maximize the results.
For the future work, we will explore the feasibility of
probabilistic counting as an anonymity tool. We will in-
vestigate the information leakage of the CIPC, which im-
plies how much uncertainty the system gives and proba-
bility of a user being identified by an attacker.
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